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Abstract
We assess the conceptual and empirical features of a number of house
price series for the United States. We then calculate a measure of the net
upgrading of the existing stock of houses that took place during the 1950-1989
period and adjust price indexes for this net increase in quality. Judgments
about the trend, volatility, and determinants of house prices are shown to
depend crucially on which price series is used. The Freddie Mac upgrade-
adjusted house price measure rose 5.7% over the past four decades, falling
7.7% from 1950 through 1970 before rising 14.5% from 1970 through 1989. Real
house prices declined in the early 1980s as a result of the increase in real
after-tax interest rates and the decline in real materials costs. The
recovery of house prices in the late 1980s is attributed to lower unemployment
and real after-tax interest rates and particularly to demographic.factors
associated with the aging of baby boomers.
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Boston or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.The Measurement and Determinants of Single-Family House Prices
Research in real estate has long been hampered by the quality of price
data for various categories of real estate. In spite of the long-standing
importance of real estate as a household and a business asset and in spit~ of
the wide variety of alternative price series currently available for single-
family homes, data limitations persist. Though it is common to hear
references to "house prices," none of the currently available series
adequately measures what we presume is meant by the term: the national-
average, quality-adjusted price of the stock of structures plus lots
("houses").                                                                 ~
Below we describe and analyze a number of available house price
measures. The timing and magnitude of fluctuations in alternative measures of
house prices differ considerably. Estimates of the increase in real house
prices over the past two decades, for example, range from a low of about 10%
to nearly 90%. The Freddie Mac series, adjusted for the net investment that
takes place through expenditures on additions and alterations, rises much less
than most other indexes of house prices, increasing only I~% in real terms
from 1970 through 1989. Next we estimate models of real house prices that
incorporate financing, income, demographic, and cost factors. The real after-
tax mortgage rate, construction costs, and demographic factors, especially
those associated with the baby boom, can account for much of the postwar
movement in real house prices.
House Price. Data
House Prices and Quality Chanqe
Because different series embody different concepts of house prices,
which series is most useful depends on the purpose at hand. Some series track
2prices of new hous,es; some measure the prices of existing houses. Most
measure the prices of structures and lot, although the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis’ implicit d~flator for residential investment excludes land value.
Some attempt to control for quality change over time; others do not. A house
price series that does not adjust for increasing quality over time will
produce an upward-biased measure of the increase in the price of a u~it of
housing services. Yet no currently available house price data series
completely adjusts the national-average price of the existing stock of houses
(including land value) for quality change over a long time span.
House price measures with and without land may differ substantially. To
the extent that both the short-run and the long-run price elasticities of land
supply are lower than those of construction labor and materials., an increase
in the demand for houses may raise land’s share of the value of structure and
lot. In fact, differences in land’s share account for much of the variation
in house prices through time and across regions. According to the National
Association of Home Builders’ Construction Cost Survey, the cost of the
finished lot comprised 11% of the total cost of a typical new house in 1949,
21% by 1969, and 27% by 1988. Thus, house price measures that omit land value
are likely to be severely biased downward over the past four decades. For
example, the real residential investment deflator rose by 0.8% between 1949
and 1988. This increase coupled with the increase in land’s share of total
value over this period implies an increase in real house prices of 22.9%.I
Two methods of obtaining quality-adjusted price series for existing
houses have been employed, the hedonic technique and the repeat-sales
approach. For example, Thibodeau [28] has derived quality-adjusted price
IThe relationship between the value of structures (VS), land (VL) and houses
(VH) ,is VH = VS + VL. If s represents land’s share of total house value, VL =
sVH, and VH : VS/(I - s).indexes based on hedonic techniques for ten years for a number of cities.
Unfortunately, insufficient data exist to produce such an index for house
prices nationwide over a long time span. The repeat-sales method compares the
prices of individual houses that are resold over time (for example, Abraham
and Schauman [2] and Case and Shiller [8]). While this largely controls for
quality, provided maintenance, repair, and other expenditures are only just
sufficient to offset depreciation, net upgrading of the existing stock of
houses can produce upward-biased measures of the increase in the price of
-constant~quality houses.
When quality change is not explicitly controlled for, non-repeat-sales
indexes are biased by the changing composition of transactions. Measures l.ike
the average or median sales price reflect the combination of shifts in prices
of houses of constant quality, as well as shifts in the average quality of
houses sold. An increase in incomes or a decrease in financing costs, for
example, would be expected to lead to an increase in the price of houses of a
given quality as well as a shift in sales toward houses of~higher quality
(Hendershott and Thibodeau [17]). The resulting systematic measurement errors
in the dependent variable would bias regression estimates of income and
interest rate effects on house prices. Measured price increases and
regression estimates would also be biased if houses that have appreciated
relatively more are sold relatively more frequently. That might occur if
house price appreciation itself provided the additional equity to allow
homeowners ,constrained by loan-to-value limits to "trade up" to higher-quality
housing.
Biased measures of price increases can also result from non-random
sampling of transactions. Truncation bias will result if houses in differentprice categories appreciate at different rates and the price series excludes
observations from some price categories; for example, those financed with
above-ceiling mortgages. The conforming loan ceiling imposed on federally
sponsored agencies operating in the secondary market and the ceiling on the
~size of FHA-insured loans may produce such biases over either the short run or
the long run. However, to the extent that ceilings move in response to market
conditions, this bias is attenuated. If the ceilings move sluggishly but
completely in response to changes in general market prices, short-run bias may
be considerable but little or no long-run bias will be present.
Data Characteristics
Table I lists characteristics of various house price indexes. The data
sources are the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the National Association
of Realtors (NAR), the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the Mortgage Interest Rate
Survey of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (now the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS)), the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Abraham and Schauman [2]).
Only the FHA series and the BEA’s implicit deflator for residential
investment series are available before 1963. Because the demand for data may
be importantly driven by significant variance and by chanqes in the general
level of (real or nominal) house prices, the lack of data may indicate that
neither was large nor of particular concern much before the 1970s.~
21ndeed, the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center Survey of
Consumer Attitudes shows that people judged house prices to be high in the 1970s,
but relatively low from the mid 1950s to the mid 1960s and, perhaps surprisingly,
in the 1980s. From the late 1960s through the early 1980s, about 25% of
respondents claimed it was a bad time to buy because house price levels were
high, while only about 5% claimed it was a good time to buy because prices were
low. From the mid 1950s until the late 1960s, the percentage responding that
house prices were low rose from about 5 to about 20%, while the percent
































































YesThe FHA calculates the median value of single-family homes purchased
each year that are financed with mortgages insured by its Section 203 program.
This series is based on appraised values and has been adjusted by subtracting
the closing costs that FHA includes in its price series. One advantage of the
~FHA series is that it is the only series that is available for several decades
and also includes the value of land. On the other hand, the FHA series makes
no attempt to adjust for quality change over time. Furthermore, because
ceilings exist on FHA loan size, this series is subject to truncation bias.3
However, this bias has been mitigated by the frequent raising of the FHA
ceiling in response to house price increases.4 Indeed, median FHA house
prices fell relative to the FHA ceiling throughout much of the period. This
may suggest that truncation bias has lessened over time.
The NAR measure of the median sales price of existing single-family
houses, available since 1968, is probably the most widely known measure of
house prices. The disadvantages of this series are that it reflects changes
in the composition and quality of houses sold and that it is not available for
a long period of time.
We consider three house price measures from the Housing Sales Survey of
the Bureau of the Census and include two in our analysis. This survey
contains information on the physical characteristics and sales prices of new,
about 20% responded that house prices were low, while about 10% referred to then
as high.
3The sample is further limited by excluding cash transactions, as is also
the case with the OTS series. Further bias is possible in the price series to
the extent that the distribution of cash sales differs from sales that involve
credit.
4Greenlees’ [13] in-depth investigation of this issue concluded that
truncation bias in the case of FHA data was likely to be negligible.single-family houses.,s Since 1963, a median and an average (CMEAN) sales
price series have been calculated for new, single-family houses sold. The
most important drawbacks of these two series are that they are limited to new
houses and that they make no attempt to hold quality constant. Failure to
adjust a new house price series for quality may be more serious than not
adjusting a price series for existing houses, because new houses are likely to
incorporate changes in quality, for example through technological innovations,
more rapidly than the existing housing stock. Because the median and average
series move so similarly, we report results only for the average.
The Census Bureau also provides a constant-quality series (CQ) for the
1963-1989 period.,6 Using hedonic regression techniques, prices were adjusted
for quality as measured by I0 physical characteristics: floor area, number of
stories, number of bathrooms, presence of central air conditioning, type of
parking facility, type of foundation, geographic division within region,
whether the house is inside a metropolitan statistical area, square footage of
land included, and whether there is a fireplace.7 Because Only lot size, and
not lot quality per square foot, is taken into account, a downward bias in
this index will emerge to the extent that, on average, lower lot quality per
~The curr’ent annual sample consists of approximately 13,000 new houses sold
by speculative builders.
6A new version of the quality-adjusted series beginning in 1977 is also
available. It uses 1987 as the base year for quality comparisons, while the
earlier series was based on typical 1982 houses, a change that could, but in
practice dqes not, make much difference. This series omits a_D_Z explicit
adjustment for changes in lot size or value, which typically is one of the most
important determinants of house prices in hedonic models. Because this series
is available only since 19}7, we have not included it in our analysis.
7The latter two characteristics were not included for the 1963-73 period.
Construction of these series is explained in more detail in U.S. Bureau of the
Census [34].
8square foot is used in new construction over time. Such a bias is likely
because new construction on average takes place further down the rent
gradient.
The Mortgage Interest Rate Survey calculates the average prices of
~ecently sold new and existing single-family houses that are financed by
institutions monitored by OTS.B These series do not adjust for changing
composition over time or for other sources of changing quality of the houses
being financed. They have the additional drawback of being subject to
truncation bias. Being averages of conventional, conforming first mortgages,
they exclude from the sample some mortgages at the low end of the distribution
(e.g., FHA mortgages) and all at the high end ("jumbo" loans). Because the
two series are so similar, we include only the series for existing houses
(MIRSEX) in our analysis.
Annual measures of the implicit price deflator for residential
investment expenditures (RESDEF) are available from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis’ National Income and Product Accounts starting in 1929. While this
series has the advantage of being available over a long time span and, in
principle, holds constant the quality of the structure being priced, it is
limited to new construction, it measures not just the price of single-family
homes but the price of residential construction generally, and it does not
include the value of land. As indicated above, omitting land value can affect
the average growth rate of house prices substantially.
Recently, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) has
8The data are based on a sample taken over the first five days of each
month. The change in the sampling procedure in 1973 introduces an inconsistency
in the series based on this survey. Nourse [23] reports that the new-procedure
observation for the new house price series in February 1973 is 7% lower than that
based on the pre-1973 sampling procedure.used the repeat-sales methodology to construct a house price index (FRED)
based on approximately seven million loans that have passed through its
portfolio.9 The main advantages of the repeat sales approach are that it
controls for changing composition of house sales and holds constant the
location of the house, which is likely to be the primary determinant of lot
quality.I° This series also has the advantage of being based on a large,
national sample. It does have the d~sadvantage that no allowance is made for
quality change at a given address. Because this index is based on
conventional conforming mortgages, it may also suffer from truncation bias.
However, truncation bias stemming from Freddie Mac’s mortgage size ceiling may
not be a severe problem in practice. Based on simulations, Abraham [I]
concludes that counterbalancing biases render the Freddie Mac series
representative of the actual price experience in the 1980s. Hendershott [14],
on the other hand, conjectures that the increases between 1985 and 1989 are
likely to be biased upward because the downward truncation bias was reduced
when the conforming loan limits were substantially increased during this
period. Thus, we use the Freddie Mac series to construct a price index of the
national stock of existing houses. Because the Freddie Mac series does not
adjust for changes in structure quality .at given locations, we adjust it for
net upgrading.
Price Trends and Variability
Table 2 presents summary statistics for real house prices for the 1963-
9See ~braham and Schauman [2] for a thorough and balanced introduction to
the features of the Freddie Mac Weighted Repeat Sales index, which is aggregated
from four Census region series using 1987 NAR weights. Those shares are
virtually the same as the shares of the stock of housing units by region.
1°For an early example o.f the repeat-sales technique, see Bailey, Muth, and
Nourse [4], and more recently, Case and Shiller [8].
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Percentage Without Regard Relative to
Series Chanqe to Trendb Own Trendc
FHA 26% 12.4% 5.4%
NAR 34 9.5 4.3
Census Average 86 18.4 5.5
Census Constant Quality 17 8.1 5.2
MIRS Existing 53 17.1 9.7
Residential Investment 12 5.4 4.0
Freddie Mac 31 7.9 5.2
aDeflated by the GNP deflator.
bAs a percentage of the mean of the sample.
CAs a percentage of the standard deviation of series from its trend.
1189 and 1970-89 periods. The percentage changes in real (i.e., deflated by the
GNP deflator) house prices are shown.11 Also shown are two measures of the
variability of the price series. Column 2 reports the standard deviation of
each series as a percentage of its own sample mean. Column 3 presents the
percentage standard deviation of each series from its trend.12
A notable feature of these price series is the enormous difference in
their long-run growth rates. The real growth rates fall into two distinct
groups: the NAR, the FHA, the Census constant quality, the residential
investment deflator, and the Freddie Mac series grow relatively slowly; the
Mortgage Interest Rate Survey and Census average series grow relatively
rapidly. This bifurcation results in part from conceptual differences: the
series that attempt to adjust for quality change grow more slowly. The
quality-adjusted series also tend to exhibit somewhat less variability, with
the percentage standard deviations of the series not adjusted for quality
~being roughly double those~f the quality-adjusted series. Indeed, the
quality-adjusted series sometimes have moved relatively little over periods as
long as a decade.
Housing demand studies find that more housing quality is demanded as
real incomes rise (Mayo [22]). The long-run increase in real incomes then
will raise the (quality-unadjusted) average price of purchased houses relative
to the price Of "constant-quality" houses. While the Census constant-quality
11Throughout, real values are obtained by deflating nominal values by the
implicit price deflator for GNP.
12For ~his series, the standard deviations of the residuals were obtained
by regressing the logarithm of each real house price series on a constant and a
linear time trend. The percentage variationwas then calculated as follows: The
base of the natural logarithm was raised to the power of the standard deviation
of the residuals. One is then subtracted. That difference is then multipllied
by 100.
12series rises only 14% from 1963 to 1989, the unadjusted average price series
rises by 98%. This implies that the quality of new homes has risen by 74%
((1.98/1.14)-I) over the past quarter-century.13 Thus, according to the
Census series, quality change accounts for three-fourths of the increase in
these real new house prices over thi~ period. However, this series,
~discontinued in 1989, may .overestimate the increase in quality since the late
1970s. The Census revised hedonic-based model indicates that between 1977 and
1989 prices rose 12 percent more, and quality concomitantly less, than
estimated by its previous model.
The series that rises least (13%) from 1963 through 1989 is the deflator
for residential investment. Its relatively slow growth is not too surprising
given that it is quality-adjusted and that it omits the value of land, whose
relative price rose markedly over this period. That the residential
investment deflator is the least volatile series suggests that much of the
short-run movement in house (i.e., structure and lot) prices is attributable
to changes in land value.
Quality Change in the Exitsting Housing Stock
The large increase over time in the Census average price series relative
to the quality-adjusted price series indicates that new houses have increased
in quality. The average quality of existing houses rises through time both
because the quality of new houses flowing into the stock rises and because
13The implied 2.1 annual percentage change is virtually the same as that
reported by Hendershott and Thibodeau [17].
141ts volatility may also be reduced by the BEA procedure of using a three-
quarter moving average of the underlying single-family structure price series in
constructing the residential deflator.
13existing houses are upgraded.
The amount of net upgrading can be obtained from data on the net
investment in the existing stock of houses. The U.S. Department of Commerce
measure of the net stock of residential structures is based on the assumption
of straight-line physical depreciation over 80 years (i.e., 1.25%
annually).15 Offsetting the decline in quality associated with depreciation
is the gross flow of expenditures made to maintain and to upgrade the quality
of houses (Apgar [3]). The Bureau of the Census [31] reports expenditures, in
real terms, on residential property maintenance, repair, and improvements.
Typically, over half of such expenditures are classified as "improvements."
"Additions and alterations" are generally about 40% of expenditures. Indeed,
the Bureau of the Census [29] reports that the following percentages of
existing homes underwent these repairs, improvements, or alterations during
1985 and 1986: 5% built additions, 8% remodeled kitchens, 9% remodeled
bathrooms, 14% bought and installed storm windows or doors, 9% added
insulation, and 19% reported other major work. The Censu~ [31] estimated that
over $60 billion was spent to maintain, repair, and upgrade all owner-occupied
properties in 1988.
We use the Census data as a starti~ng point in calculating the net
percentage increase in the real net stock of residential structures and lots
that is due to the net upgrading of the existing stock. Net investment is
obtained by subtracting from gross investment the real value of physical
depreciatiQn, which is the product of the Commerce Department’s physical
15See Palmquist [24] and Randolph [26, 27] for estimates of the physical
depreciation rate for housing. 1.25% is greater than the average depreciation
rate in the studies surveyed by Randolph [26]. Some of those estimates refer to
multi-family and other rental housing, which may have different, perhaps lower,
depreciation rates than owner-occupied and single-family units.
14depreciation rate for residential structures and its estimate of the stock of
real net residential structures. This real net investment is then.divided by
a measure of the real net residential capital stock (including land value) to
obtain the real net percentage increase in the quality of the existing
~oresidential capital stock.16 The resulting measure deliberately omits
upgrading of the stock due to the inflow of higher quality houses.
This measure underestimates gross and net investment, and thus net
~upgrading, to the extent that unmeasured labor time is used to repair,
renovate, or otherwise maintain or improve the quality of housing at a given
location. To make allowance for this-widespread phenomenon, we have included
an estimate of the value of unmeasured labor time, or "sweat equity." The
Census reports separate data for materials purchased by homeowners and for
payments to contractors. Because the value of materials is approximately
equal to the value of labor in market-based construction generally (Baily and
Gordon [5]), we assumed that the value of homeowners’ labor time would be
about the same as the value of the materials they purchased. The U.S. Bureau
of the Census [31] reports that about half of materials used for projects of
this type are purchased by homeowners, while the other half are provided
through builders. In the late 1980s, the value of materials purchased by
homeowners, and thus the estimated value of unmeasured labor time, is about
25% of total expenditures on owner-occupied properties. Since expenditures on
owner-occupied properties are about 60% of total outlays, we raised gross
measured outlays for materials and labor on all properties by 15% to allow for
16The value Of land is obtained by using the Commerce Department estimate
of the net residential capital stock, whiCh only includes structure value, and
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [6] ratio of the household
sector’s ownership of residential structures and land.
15the estimated value of sweat equity. This adjustment raises the average
annual growth rate of quality over the 1948 to 1989 period by one-third, from
0.66% to 0.89%.17
This measure of net upgrading is plotted in Figure 1, which shows that
the "rehab boom" of the middle and late 1980s substantially raised the growth
rate of the average quality of the standing stock of housing. Net investment
was also substantial in the period before the mid 1960s. The adjustment to a
price series implied by this amount of net upgrading is sizable. In the case
of the Freddie Mac series, its real growth rate over the 1970-1989 period is
lowered from 31% to 14%.
Figure 2 illustrates that series with similar average growth rates over
a given time span may have quite different trajectories within that time span.
Three conceptually different house price measures are plotted: the adjusted
Freddie Mac series (FRED-ADJ), the FHA series and the residential investment
deflator. Though these series rose similarly during the 1970s, in the 1980s
their movements bore little resemblance to each other. Th6 residential
investment deflator generally trends down through the 1980s, while the FHA
series generally rises. The adjusted Freddie Mac series drops sharply in the
early 1980s and then rises very rapidly.. Thus, in spite of their similar
average growth rates over the past two decades, these real house price series
are neither highly nor stably correlated with each other. The simple
correlations of the adjusted Freddie Mac series with the other two are only
0.30 and 0.~3, while the latter two series have a simple correlation
17The results reported below are based on the net upgrading series that
includes the value of unmeasured homeowner labor. Clearly, including the sweat
equity adjustment lowers both the level and the growth rate of real house prices.
However, excluding the value of homeowners’ labor produces regression results
qualitatively similar to those presented in the tables.
16Figure 1
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!8coefficient of 0.70. And as we shall see below, these series also respond
considerably differently to economic and demographic forces.
Determinants of House Prices
~     A reduced-form equation for (the log of) real house prices as a function
of the unemployment rate, financing costs, demographic factors, and materials
costs can be obtained from a model of the aggregate supply of and demand for
houses. The stock supply of houses (I) responds positively to real house
prices and negatively to the real price of construction materials (RPCON):
HS = F(P, RPCON) (I)
(+) (-)
The demand for houses (2) depends positively on the real income per household
of a given age (INC) and on the size and age distribution of the population
(HH), and negatively on real house prices (P), the cyclical component of the
unemployment rate (UGAP), and~homeowners’ real after-tax borrowing costs
(RATMR).18 The share of household heads aged 20-29 (POP2Os) is also included
in order to capture the labor market effects of atypically large cohorts
entering the labor market. To the extent such cohorts depress the real
incomes of their members relative to normal (as captured by INC and HH), the
impact of POP20s is expected to be negative.
HD = G(P, UGAP, RATMR, INC, HH, POP2Os) (2)
(-) (-) (-) (+) (+)
Equating demand and supply produces the reduced-form equation for real house
prices:
P = H(UGAP, RATMR, INC, HH, POP2Os, RPCON) (3)
18Because financing costs can also affect the supply function for housing,
the reduced-form coefficient associated with financing costs can be expected to
reflect both influences, though the demand effect is likely to dominate.
19(-) (=) (+) (+) (=)     (+)
Supply Considerations
Shifts of the supply function of land and structures depend upon
technological advance in sectors that provide and use them. Above-average
advances in construction, materials, or agricultural technology (depending
upon the extent to which they are biased in one direction or another), the
opening up of previously inaccessible land, and even changes in world weather
patterns could produce such shifts. Above-average technological advance in
construction, for example, could imply perennial rightward supply shifts that
might justify the inclusion of a time trend in the house supply function (I).
There seems little reason to expect A ~, however, that relative
technological advance will be above average. If anything, the dismal
performance of measured construction labor productivity wouldsuggest that
technological advance has been slower than average in this sector (Baily and
Gordon [5] and Hendershott [15]). Relying on these measures of productivity
growth could be misleading, however, because unmeasured change in the quality
of residential construction may have been a source of underestimates of
construction output, and therefore productivity growth.
The slope of the national residential land supply curve is not obviously
either very flat or very steep. Some evidence supports the view that the
long-run national land supply curve is not horizontal, thereby allowing demand
shifts to change real house prices. The real per acre price of farm land and
buildings rose at a compound annual rate of about 0.7% between 1850 and 1950,
and the real per acre price of farm land rose I% annually from 1950 through
1990 (U.S. Bureau of the Census [32]). The supply of land to urban uses
holding quality constant, particularly its accessibility, is very likely to be
20upward sloped. Case and Kopcke [7] show that the real per square foot price
of land five to ten miles from the center of Boston rose at a compound annual
rate of 1.9 percent between 1850 and 1950; since then it has risen at a faster
rate on average. It seems more reasonable to account for the persistent
~!ncrease in real land prices in part by demand sliding up a positively sloped
land supply curve, rather than exclusively by a horizontal supply curve for
land shifting upward.
To proxy for shifts in the housing supply function due to changes in the
relative price of construction materials, we include RPCON, the log of the
real producer price index for intermediate stage materiaTs and components for
construction (Council of Economic Advisers [i0], p. 366). The real price of
construction materials fluctuates considerably through time. Over the decades
of the 1950s and 1960s, for example, construction materials prices relative to
the GNP deflator fell by about 17%. The relative prices of gypsum, roofing,
and lumber fell even more (U.S. Bureau of the Census [32]). The price of
plywood actually fell in nominal terms, resulting in a 50% decline in its real
cost between 1950 and 1970. During the 1970s and 1980s, however, real
construction materials prices rose 5%. Lumber prices rose by 14%, for
example, while the real prices of gypsum and plywood fell by 6% and 17%,
respectively.
The relative price of construction-materials is taken to be
predetermined. To the extent that, instead, causality runs from changes in
the demand for houses to the relative price of construction materials, OLS
estimates of the reduced-form equation for real house prices (3) will be
affected by simultaneity bias. To assess whether shifts in the demand for
houses are likely to have been an important source of changes in RPCON over
21the 1950-89 period, RPCON was regressed on the other, presumably predetermined
determinants of demand (UGAP, RATMR, INC, HH, and POP2Os, as described more
fully below). One signal of the endogeneity of the relative price of
construction materials with respect td house prices would be its significant
positive reaction to increases in the determinants of the demand for houses.
However, over the 1950-89 period, little evidence of such a reaction is found.
Real after-tax interest rates and the demographic variable POP20s are each
statistically insignificant, and, while the unemployment rate and the
household and income variables are statistically significant, increases in the
demand for houses emanating from these sources are estimated to reduce the
relative price of materials.
Unemployment and Interest Rate Effects
The cyclical component of the unemployment rate, UGAP, is included to
allow for the possibility that income constra~ints, uncertainty, and other
factors associated with the transitory departures of real income from its
underlying trend affect the demand for houses. UGAP is calculated as the
difference between the actual unemployment rate and the natural, or
equilibrium,, rate.19
The nominal after-tax mortgage interes~ rate has been calculated as the
secondary-market yield on FHA mortgages times one minus the DRI series for the
average marginal federal income tax rate.2° In the absence of a data series
for the expected lonq-term inflation rate, the expected real rate was obtained
19Values for the natural rate of unemployment for 1950 - 1988 are taken from
the Congressional Budget Office [9]. The 1989 value is set equal to the 1988
value. The Congressional Budget Office [9] uses the values from Gordon [12] for
its estimates for 1950 - 1980.
2°See Poterba [25] for illustrations of the substantial changes in after-tax
housing costs during the 1980s.
22by subtracting the Livingston survey inflation rate expectation for the
upcoming year. In order to assess whether our results were sensitive to this
particular formulation, other specifications were also tested. To match the
interest rate and expected inflation rate maturities (at one year), one
~asure (RATS) subtracted the Livingston expected inflation rate from the
after-tax Treasury bill rate measured on a bond-equivalent basis. Another
measure (RATTB) substituted the 10-year Treasury bond rate for the mortgage
rate. This measure effectively removed the time-varying call premium present
in prepayable FHA mortgage rates that is not present in non-callable ~reasury
bonds. The last measure (RATTP) subtracted the spread between 10-year and
one-year Treasuries from RATMR.
The four financing cost specifications are shown in Figure 3. Though
these measures differ somewhat over short time spans, they closely track each
o.ther over the full sample: their simple correlations were each above 0.9 for
the 1950-1989 period. Noteworthy are their long, accelerating slides from the
early 1950s until 1980 and their abrupt increases early in the 1980s. The
average values in the 1980s are not much above those experienced during the
1950s and 1960s. Apparently, the factors that have moved these rates over the
past four decades have predominantly affected the general level of interest
rates rather than the spreads between them. As a result, none of these
specifications led to appreciably different results from those reported below
for RATMR.
Income and Demoqraphic Effects
INC, HH, and POP20s are intended to capture the effects of income (apart
from the effects associated with transitory movements of the unemployment
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24It is widely accepted that the demand for houses rises fairly steeply with
real income per household (Hendershott [15]). INC is the logarithm.of real
income per constant-age-household. INC is designed to capture the effects of
changes in real income per household over time, apart from those arising from
:hanges in the age-earnings profile. The effect of changing age structure on
the age-earnings profile will be described below and proxied by the variable
POP2Os. INC deliberately avoids incorporating changing age-earnings profile
effects by using the income of a family headed by someone likely to be less
affected by the entrance of baby boomers into the labor market. The income
measure used to calculate INC is the real median ahnual income of a family
with a head of household between 45 and 54 years of age (U.S. Bureau of the
Census [30]). Measures of average real income per hour, worker, or family, on
the other hand, would not suffice because they are affected by the demographic
composition of the labor force.
Similarly, the greater the number of households, the greater the demand
for houses. HH is the~logarithm of the number of households weighted by the
average tendency of various categories of households to be homeowners.
Homeownership rates by age reflect (I) the progression along the typical
upward slope of the age-earnings profile and (2) the greater desire of older
households to own their own homes (Hendershott [15]). The combination of
these two factors produces a demand for houses that is a fairly steeply rising
function of age. The demand for houses is also greater for married couples,
ceteris paribus. To reflect these three effects on the demand for houses, HH
weights the number of households in each age and marital status category by
25the long-run average homeownership rate of that category.21 By basing HH on
the long-run average homeownership rates, rather than those observed year by
year, it reflects the typical age-earnings profile that each age and marital
status group has faced.
Over the past four decades, INC and HH have been dominated by their
upward trends, making the correlation between them extremely high. Because of
that collinearity and the likelihood that the elasticities of the demand for
houses with respect to income per household and the number of weighted
households are quite similar, INC and HH were summed to form INCHH. T-tests
did not reject the hypothesis that the elasticities of INC and HH were the
s ame.
Another demographically based effect operates through the ratio of
households headed by a person aged 20 to 29 to those whose head is aged 30 to
54 (POP2Os), which captures the change in the age-earnings profile brought on
by changes in the age structure of the labor force.~2 As a demographic bulge
like the baby boom flows into the labor force, the ratio df the number of
young to older workers rises. As a result, the real incomes of individual
baby boomers are temporarily depressed, thereby steepening their age-earnings
profiles (Freeman [Ii], Welch [35]). POP2Os, plotted in Figure 4, began to
rise as the first baby boomers entered their twenties in the late 1960s. The
~IThe "long-run" average homeownership rates by age and marital status are
averages of the rates calculated from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 decennial Censuses
of Ho~using~and Housing Vacancy Survey, taken from Hendershott [16]. The data for
the numberer households by age and marital status are taken from U.S. Bureau of
the Census [33].
2~For a more detailed discussion of demographic effects on income and.the
demand for houses, see Lapkoff, Peek and Wilcox [18]. The ratio of young to
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27peak years for PoP20s are from the early 1970s through the middle of the
1980s. Then, as the baby boomers age further, POP20s recedes as boomers swell
the ranks of the 30- to 54-year-old group.
Individual baby boomers’ incomes can be expected to rise faster than the
historical average age-earnings profile would indicate because, as they age,
they become closer substitutes for other, older workers. This atypically
rapid income growth, combined with lenders’ practices that impose payment-to-
income ceilings without regard to age, unleashes baby boomers’ "pent-up"
demand for houses. The easing of borrowing constraints implies greater demand
for houses than would be predicted by specifications that ignore the "catch-
up" of baby boomer real incomes.
Empirical Evidence
Table 3 presents the results for the 1970-89 period of regressing the
log of various real house price measures on a constant term, the level of the
unemployment rate gap (UGAP), the level of the real after-t~ax mortgage
interest rate (RATMR), the sum of the logs of real income per constant-age
household and of the number of weighted households (INCHH), the ratio of
household heads aged 20 to 29 to those aged 30 to 54 (POP2Os), and the log of
real construction materials prices (RPCON). The bottom two rows contain the
unadjusted (FRED) and the upgrade-adjusted (FRED-ADJ) versions of the Freddie
Mac house price series.
Judgments about both the size and the statistical significance of some
of the determinants of house prices are sensitive to the choice of house price
series. The effects of cyclically higher unemployment, for example, are
significantly positive in one case (FHA), significantly negati.ve in one case
28Table 3
House Price Equations, 1970 - 1989
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29(FRED-ADJ), and statistically insignificant otherwise. In no case is the
coefficient’s t-statistic larger than 2.4. The lack of compelling evidence
that transitory unemployment affects the prices of long-term assets is not
particularly surprising. On the other hand, because we take FRED-ADJ (bottom
row of table 3) to be the most appropriate of these house price series, we
place relatively more weight on the finding that cyclically higher
unemployment rates lower house prices.
Six out of eight price series respond negatively to real after-tax
interest rates. The series that deliver positive interest rate effects are
two of the most widely used series, the Census constant-quality series and the
residential investment deflator. Based on the FRED-ADJ results, however,
higher real after-tax mortgage interest rates lower real house prices. This
effect is statistically significant and substantial: a 1 percentage point
increase in this interest rate reduces house prices by 1 3/4%.
In contrast to the unemployment and interest rate coefficient estimates,
the other coefficients are uniformly signed across price s~ries. The
coefficients on INCHH are always significant, though they span a wide range:
from about 0.1 to about 1.0. The estimated POP20s coefficients are always
negative, and significantly so for four .of the price series. Higher materials
costs raise every measure of house prices, significantly in five out of eight
cases. In the preferred FRED-ADJ specification, the estimated coefficient on
RPCON of 0.422 is reassuringly close to materials’ share (about one-half) of
total construction costs.
Table 4 contains results fod the longer, 1950-1989 sample period.
RESDEF and FHA are both available for this entire sample period. FHA-ADJ has
been constructed by making the same adjustment to FHA for net upgrading as was
3OTable 4
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] .96applied to FRED to obtain FRED-ADJ. Because there are no Freddie Mac data
before 1970, we Splice the 1950-70 values for FHA-ADJ onto FRED-ADJ. Thus,~
FRED-ADJ in Table 4 is a hybrid series whose reliability is presumably greater
for the post-1970 period. This series is plotted in Figure 4. Values of the
variables used in Table 4 are listed in the Appendix.
Rows I, 3, and 5 in Table 4 present OLS results. The top row shows the
FRED-ADJ results, which do not differ greatly from those in Table 3. The
coefficient estimates for INCHH and POP20s of about 0.1 and -1.0 are nearly
identical across the different sample periods used for Tables 3 and 4. Not
surprisingly then, an F-test does not reject the hypothesis of coefficient
stability over a mid-sample split.
The OLS results for FHA-ADJ differ appreciably from those for FRED-ADJ.
In row 3, the UGAP coefficient is insignificantly positive and the estimated
effect of higher real after-tax mortgage interest rates is to drive real house
prices up! On the other hand, the estimated impacts of INCHH, POP2Os, and
RPCON are similar to their effects on FRED-ADJ. The OLS ~stimates based on
RESDEF (row 5) also differ from the FRED:ADJ results. Again, higher real
after-tax mortgage rates are estimated to raise house prices, and POP20s is
insignificant, but positive. Thus, judgment about the strength, reliability,
and direction of various variables’ effects on house prices depends crucially
on which measure of house prices is judged most appropriate.
The low Durbin-Watson statistics in Tables 3 and 4 suggest
misspecification and also call into question the validity of the calcuTated t-
statistics. Rows 2, 4 and 6 of Table 4 present regression estimates that
allow for nonrandom residuals. An ARMA(I,1) process for the residuals was
chosen a priori to allow the data latitude to reveal evidence that might
32suggest equation misspecification. In the case of FRE.D-ADJ, the magnitudes
and statistical significance of the coefficients are little affected by
allowing for ARMA(1,1) terms.~3 The FHA-ADJ results are likewise little
affected. The results for the residential investment deflator, however,
~hange dramatically, with only RPCON retaining a calculated t-statistic
greater than two.
The results in row 6 are consistent with the arguments presented above,
that effects on house prices of changes in the aggregate demand for houses
operate primarily through changes in the price of land. The residential
investment deflator, the series that omits land value, responds significantly
only to RPCON, the proxy for supply curve shifts. Contrary to Mankiw and Weil
[21], we are unable to detect demand effects on the residential investmen~
deflator. Neither after-tax real interest rates, long-run or short-run
movements in income, nor demographic factors had any statistically significant
effect on this particular measure of house prices, although each of these
factors did affect the quality-adjusted Freddie Mac series with statistically
significant coefficients of the predicted sign.
We also investigated the extent to which financial forces other than
those operating through RATMR and the steepening of the age-earnings profile
have affected house prices. The high and variable nominal interest rates in
the 1970s and 1980s are sometimes suggested as important determinants of
household spending (Manchester [20], Linneman and Wachter [19] and Wilcox
[36]). In particular, we looked to see if the demand for housing has been
23A Dickey-Fuller test of the OLS residuals produced a t-statistic of -4.27,
allowing us to reject their being non-stationary. On that basis, we acceptedthe
formulation in the top row of table 4 as a co-integrated relation. Estimation
of an error-correction formulation based on that co-integr,ated relation produced
a significantly (t=-3.23) negative error-correction term coefficient (-0.55).
33restrained by borrowing constraints associated with nominal interest rates.
In general, given the inclusion of real after-tax rates, nominal (before-tax)
interest rate coefficients were found to be insignificant, so we have not
reported them here.24
Decomposition of House Price Movements
Table 5 uses the coefficient estimates from the top row of Table 4 to
obtain the percentage change in real house prices over various subperiods
attributable to each of the explanatory variables. The difference between the
actual and the explained movement over each of the subperiods is the residual.
The top row in Table 5 shows that, after’rising a little in the 1950s, real
house prices fell by more than 9% during the 1960s. That decline can be
accounted for by the decline in real construction materials costs. In the
1970s, real house prices rose by nearly as much as they fell in the 1960s.
The combination of higher real materials costs and the decline in real after-
tax interest rates in the 1970s more than offset the depressing effect of
higher unemployment and the reduction in the average age of the labor force.
Between 1980 and 1984 real house prices fell about 11%. Over half of
that decline is attributed to the enormo.us increase in real after-tax interest
rates (Figure 3). Further downward pressure on house prices emanated from the
decline in the cost of construction materials. Some of this downward pressure
was offset by demographic factors. In the late 1980s, real house prices rose
Z4One’~nteresting pattern did _emerge in this regard, however, when we split
the sample approximately in half. Estimates based on the sample containing data
before 1970 indicated that nominal interest rates had significant negative
effects on house prices, while real rates did not; in the second half ofthe
sample, the opposite pattern held. It is surprising that nominal interest rates
were found to be insignificant here, given their significance in equations
explaining consumer spending (Wilcox [36]).
34Table 5
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35appreciably, even though the relative price of construction materials fell.
Lower unemployment rates and lower real after-tax interest rates each
accounted for an increase in real house prices of nearly 2%. The demand for
houses was also stimulated by the aging of the baby boom. INCHH and POP20s
together accounted for half of the nearly 19% rise in real house prices.25
Conclusion
This paper seeks to measure and explain house prices over the past four
decades. Accurate measures of house prices are required to reliably assess
the determinants of house prices, housing affordability, and the investment
characteristics of residential real estate and the securities it
collateralizes. We have adjusted house price indexes by allowing for the net
upgrading of the standing stock of houses. In real terms, the adjusted
Freddie Mac series rose by 5.7% over the 1950-1989 period. It rose 14.5% from
1970 to 1989, after having fallen by 7.7% from 1950 to 1970.
Real house prices are estimated to decline with increases in real after-
tax interest rates, and rise with both cyclical and more permanent income
increases and increases in the relative cost of materials. Demographic
factors such as the size and age distribution of the population are also
significant determinants of house prices.
The future course of house prices is of interest to current and
prospective homeowners, homebuilders, lenders, mortgage insurers, and
policymake~s. Forecasting house prices far into the future is inherently
25The large unexplained increase in house prices may have resulted from.the
sharp rise in the conforming loan limit in the late 1980s. Similarly, the
unexplained decline in the early 1980s may have been related to the. failure of
the loan limit to keep pace with housing market conditions.
36difficult. Baby boomers will continue to age, however, and as they do, their
demand for houses and, hence, house prices are likely to increase~-for two
reasons. First, baby boomers’ propensity for homeownership is likely to
increase as they age, even apart from re~l income increases. In this regard,
~baby boomers may differ little from the generations that preceded them, and on
this count, the demand for houses is likely to rise for at least the next two
decades. Second, the sheer size of. the baby boom cohort appears to have
significantly depressed the individual incomes of its members. A tapering-off
of this cohort effect as they age would lead to boomers’ real incomes growing
at atypically rapid rates in coming years. To the extent the demand for
houses is effectively constrained by borrowing limits that are specified in
terms of current income, these income gains will stimulate the demand for
houses. On the basis of the estimates presented here, that combination of
increased desire and ability to own homes could be expected to raise real
house prices by about 10% during the 1990s.
37DATA APPENDIX
A. Data Underlying Calculation of FRED-ADJ
FHA] Adjusted FH~J GNP
Year Freddie Mac Freddie Mac Deflator
1950 1.000 1.000 0.239
1951 1,070 1.059 0.251
1952 1.1 64 1.1 39 0.255
1953 1.254 1.21 3 0.259
1954 1.306 1.250 0.263
1955 1.303 1.233 0.272
1956 1.382 1.295 0.281
1957 1.416 1.311 0.291
1958 1.439 1.318 0.297
1959 1.460 1.321 0.304
1960 1.473 1.314 0.309
1961 1.522 1.339 0.312
1962 1.591 1.383 0.319
1963 1.621 1.393 0.324
1964 1.651 1.403 0.329
1965 1.708 1.438 0.338
1966 1.709 1.426 0.350
1967 1.785 1.478 0.359
1968 1.813 1.490 0.377
1969 1.872 1.528 0.398
1970 2.002 1.623 0.420
1971 2.127 1.712 0.444
1972 2.242 1.793 0.465
1973 2.441 1.941 0.495
1974 2.673 2.114 0.540
1975 2.882 2.263 0.593
1976 3.085 2.405 0.631
1977 3.383 2.620 0.673
1978 3.862 2.97~1 0.722
1979 4.355 3.330 0.786
1980 4.726 -3.593 0.857
1981 4.828 3.654 0.940
1982 4.940 3.726 1.000
1983 5.184 3.894 1.039
1984 5;388 4.014 1.077
1985 5.709 4.212 1.109
1986 6.150 4.487 1.138
1987 6.682 4.826 1.174
1988 7.262 5.190 1.213
1989 7.867 5.586 1.263
Note: Nominal house price series indexed to equal 1.0 in 1950.
38B. Series Used in Table 4 Regressions
Year FRED-ADJ FHA-ADJ RESDEF UGAP RATMR INCHH POP20s RPCON
1950 0.846 10.474 -0.008 0.002 0.017 10.293 0.286 4.697
1951 0.854 10.482 0.012 -0,017 0.004 10.366 0,275 4.739
1952 0.911 10.540 0.023 -0,020 0.031 10.441 0.264 4.716
1953 0.959 10.587 0.015 -0.022 0.044 10.565 0.260 4.718
1954 0.974 10.602 0,004 0.005 0.035 10.543 0.241 4.706
1955 0.926 10.555 -0.007 -0.007 0.030 10.583 0.242 4.713
1956 0.943 10.571 -0.007 -0.010 0.027 10.632 0.255 4.729
1957 0.920 10.548 -0.039 -0.008 0.030 10.644 0.250 4.700
1958 0.905 10.533 -0.059 0.018 0.034 10.668 0.248 4.680
1959 0.884 10.512 -0.082 0.003 0.032 10.729 0.246 4.684
1960 0.862 10.491 -0.091 0.003 0.037 10.792 0.247 4.662
1961 0.871 10.499 -0.101 0.015 0.030 10.829 0.249 4.637
1962 0.881 10.510 -0.120 0.003 0.030 10.877 0,258 4.61!
1963 0.873 10.50t -0.!39 0.002 0.030 10.925 0.256 4.599
1964 0.865 10.493 -0.144 -0.003 0.029 10.966 0.272 4.593
1965 0,862 10.491 -0.153 -0.011 0.028 11.015 0.287 4.575
1966 0.819 10.448 -0.157 -0.018 0.028 11.065 0.297 4.564
1967 0.830 10.458 -0.150 -0.018 0.024 11.139 0.306 4.551
1968 0.789 10.417 -0.148 -0.020 0.022 11.189 0.313 4,551
1969 0.760 10,389 -0,112 -0,021 0.024 11.256 0.339 4.551
1970 0.766 10.395 -0.127 -0.006 0.028 11.260 0,353 4.513
1971 0,764 10.392 -0.130 0.002 0.019 11.282 0.365 4.521
1972 0.764 10.381 -0.121 -0.002 0.018 tl.347 0.396 4.52~
1973 0.781 10.262 -0.100 -0.009 0.013 11.381 0.407 4.543
1974 0.779 10.329 -0.081 -0.003 -0.003 11.392 0.426 4.624
1975 0.754 10.406 -0.090 0.025 0.004 11.371 0.428 4.619
1976 0.752 10,363 -0.084 0.017 0.003 11.409 0.439 4.621
1977 0.774 10.365 -0.041 0.011 -0.000 11.446 0.433 4.634
1978 0.829 10.423 0.006 0.002 -0.002 11.474 0.438 4.663
1979 0,858 10.483 0.035 -0.001 -0,015 11,516 0.439 4.674
1980 0.848 10.527 0.042 0.013 -0.014 11.520 0.414 4.668
1981 0.772 10.496 0.027 0.016 0.021 11.532 0.419 4.646
1982 0.730 10.503 0.000 0.038 0.047 11.537 0.404 4.605
1983 0.736 10.567 -0.016 0.037 0.041 11.567 0.388 4.595
1984 0.730 10.504 -0.016 0.017 0.046 11.603 0.384 4.585
1985 0.749 10.526 -0.024 0.014 0.043 11.650 0.362 4.572
1986 0.786 10.598 -0.024 0.012 0.034 11.700 0.356 4.554
1987 0.828 10.587 -0.010 0.005 0.032 11.748 0.338 4.538
1988 0.868 10.516 -0,013 -0.002 0.031 11.750 0.328 4.561
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